Do NGOs and Donors undermine the State?

The Afrobarometer always provides highly interesting perspectives on what African citizens (as opposed to their governments) believe. Over the past decade the Afrobarometer has demonstrated the sophistication of African citizens’ understanding of politics, governance, and democracy. The findings are often surprising.

For example, recent analyses have shown the resurgence of popular support for traditional leadership, mainly because these folk provide a buffer for failing governments[1], or that youth, right across Africa, has diminishing faith in the power of elections to bring about democracy. The latter is clearly important in the light of the North African revolutions, but recent research by Resnick and Casale suggests that, whilst African youths tend to vote less and have lower levels of partisanship, they are not more likely to protest than older citizens[2].

These are interesting asides however, and we want to focus on a problem common in many African countries, the frequently fraught relations between states, donors, and civil society, especially NGOs. This is particularly interesting for Zimbabwe where there are continual statements from senior government Ministers that assert that these bodies work in concert to effect “regime change” at the worst and undermine the authority of the state at the least[3].

A very recent Afrobarometer report examined the views of African citizens about the role that donors and NGOs play in the political lives of their countries. As the Afrobarometer report pointed out, in admittedly a complex statistical analysis[4]:

Findings suggest that across a wide range of African countries, including fragile states like Liberia and stronger states like Botswana and South Africa, donors and non-state actors are strengthening, rather than undermining, citizens’ legitimating beliefs, as measured by their willingness to defer to the tax department, the police and the courts. Citizens who believe that donors and non-state actors, including domestic and international NGOs and international businesses, are doing a lot to help their country, rather than a little, are more likely to be willing to defer to the tax department. People who perceive that donors and non-state actors exert too little, rather than too much, influence over their government, are less likely to be willing to defer to the tax department, police, and courts. The opposite is true for those who perceive that donors and non-state actors exert too much influence, rather that too little influence, over their government.

Unfortunately, Zimbabwe was not included in the 19 countries from which the data was derived, but the sample of countries was sufficiently large[5] as was the number of citizens included (26,513). So this is a fair test of what African citizens think about donors and NGOs. And the findings certainly rubbish the claims by so many African governments that these bodies have a malevolent influence over their citizens.

African citizens, rather than distrusting donors and NGOs, see these bodies, where they are very present and active in a country, as strongly complimenting the work of their governments, and, very surprisingly, results in citizens claiming that this would make them more likely to pay tax, and more willing to defer to the authority of the police and the courts. Overall, this suggests a win-win situation for states and citizens: good states will attract donors, encourage non-state actors, and be rewarded with good citizens. Bad states repel donors, suppress non-state actors, and end up with unresponsive citizens.

It is also worth pointing out that it remains surprising at the continental level that donors continue to engage with so much faith in Africa, but this is not necessarily the case at the individual country level, where there may be excellent synergies between state, donors, and NGOs. Donor countries and donors continue to provide financial support to Africa in spite of the very discouraging picture. As a 2012 report from the Political Economy Research Institute points out in respect of capital flight from Sub-Saharan Africa[6]:

A key constraint to SSA’s growth and development is the shortage of financing. Indeed SSA faces large and growing financing gaps, hindering public investment and social service delivery. At the same time, the sub-region is a source of large-scale capital flight, which escalated during last decade even as the region experienced growth acceleration. The group of 33 SSA countries covered by this report has lost a total of $814 billion dollars (constant 2010 US$) from 1970 to 2010. This exceeds the amount of official development aid ($659 billion) and foreign direct investment ($306 billion) received by these countries. Oil-rich countries account for 72 percent of the total capital flight from the sub-region ($591 billion). The escalation of capital flight over the last decade coincided with the steady increase in oil prices prior to the global economic crisis.

 

Assuming that flight capital has earned (or could have earned) the modest interest rate measured by the short-term United States Treasury Bill rate, the corresponding accumulated stock of capital flight from the 33 countries stands at $1.06 trillion in 2010. This far exceeds the external liabilities of this group of countries of $189 billion (in 2010), making the region a “net creditor” to the rest of the world. The stereotypical view that SSA is severely indebted and heavily aid-dependent is not fully consistent with the facts.

 

And the general trend has been getting worse over the past four decades: net losses in the early 1970s were about US$28 billion, but by 2005-2010 they were estimated at US$202 billion. It is not the purview of this short opinion piece to examine the reasons for all this capital flight, but it does seem that the knee-jerk statements by African (and increasingly Zimbabwean leaders) to blame the West for its (and our) problems is not very honest. Some honest examination of who is sending out all that money might go some way to solving some of Africa’s economic problems, and could even pay off all of Sub-Saharan Africa’s debts.

There are also the knee-jerk attacks on the motives of the non-state actors. This is the really sorry story, because non-state actor is a term that covers virtually everyone that is not a government or a donor: NGOs, CBOs, associations like churches and sports clubs, international NGOs like Oxfam and Save the Children, and so on. African citizens say that the more of these that exist and are working hard for them, the more likely the nation and key institutions are one they trust. And, of course, they have an interest in regime change: any government that the non-state actor sector sees is not serving the interests of the people will be challenged.

But it depends on what is meant by regime change. It can range from wanting a new political party to govern (and only by election, not coup or violence) through to wanting a particular change in policy direction. Regime change straddles wanting a new government through to trying to influence a regime to change its policies, and this latter is where the vast number of NGOs put their energies. And since NGOs and CBOs in Africa are mostly filling the gaps where government cannot deliver, it is the reason why African citizens have trust in them. It also turns out that this is the core political activity in any nation, and why civil society (and its organisations) are at the heart of the political life of the citizenry.

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[1] Baldwin, K (2011), When politicians cede control of resources: Land, Chiefs and coalition- building in Africa. Working Paper No. 130. AFROBAROMETER.

[2] Resnick, D., & Casale, D (2013), The Political Participation of Africa’s Youth: Turnout, Partisanship, and Protest. Working Paper No. 136. AFROBAROMETER.

[3] Most recently these sentiments were repeated by Minister Chinamasa in the statement following the meeting between the various Zimbabwean political parties and the British government. See COMMUNIQUE ISSUED BY HONOURABLE PATRICK CHINAMASA, Deputy Secretary for Legal Affairs of ZANU PF And The Minister of Justice and Legal Affairs At the Conclusion of the Meeting of Representatives of the Inclusive Government of Zimbabwe and the Friends of Zimbabwe (FoZ) held in London, QEII Conference Centre from 25 to 26 March 2013.

[4] Sacks, A (2013), Can Donors and Non-state Actors undermine Citizens’ Legitimating Beliefs? Working Paper No.140. AFROBAROMETER.

[5] The counties were Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia.

[6] Boyce, J. K., & Ndikumana, L (2012), Capital Flight from Sub-Saharan African Countries: Updated Estimates, 1970 – 2010, October 2012. Political Economy Research Institute. University of Massachusetts, Amherst.

Free and Fair Elections?

Since 2010, RAU has been pointing out that the most important matter to be resolved ahead of any future elections is the reform of national institutions. This position has been repeatedly supported by SAPES and the Zimbabwe Liberators Platform. SADC, both through the Troika and the Summit, has also insisted on the deep message beneath the GPA: constitution AND reforms, then elections. Most recently, President Jacob Zuma himself has pointed out the need for urgent action ahead. Speaking at the recent meeting in Pretoria of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence, and Security, Zuma made the following points:

• “Security sector realignment cannot be postponed any longer”;
• “In this regard Jomic needs to be activated as a matter of priority”;
  “The facilitation team supplemented by the representatives of Tanzania and Zambia must be enabled to participate actively in Jomic”;
• “Namibia as a member and incoming chair of troika should now be included” ;
• “Without the above two points it will be difficult to ensure that there is no intimidation and that violence is not allowed to escalate, if and when it occurs.”

So, when the President and the Minister of Justice are quoted as saying that elections will be held by 29^th June, and in the shenanigans around the continued detention of Beatrice Mtetwa and the 4 MDC officials and repeated harassment of NGOs, the total absence of reforms is now critical. The kinds of reforms now needed must be realistic and effective, for there is no longer time for the kind of wishful thinking that has characterized most calls for reform by Zimbabwean political parties and civil society bodies.

As we pointed out recently and several times previously, there are four key areas of reform that can change the electoral playing field[1]:

Firstly, the security sector needs oversight, what some have termed Security Sector Governance as opposed to Security Sector Reform. The latter is a decade-long process, while the former merely requires strong civilian oversight of the uniformed services and the intelligence agencies. This achieved in two ways: appointments of the senior officials through full consensus by all political parties, and a wholly civilian oversight body – in Zimbabwe’s case, agreement between the President and the Prime Minister of the appointments to the army, the police, the prisons, and the intelligence service, the disbanding of JOC, and a wholly civilian National Security Council.

Secondly, ensure that all state institutions adhere completely to their enabling legislation. The police are not allowed to be members of political parties or participate in political activities, and shall carry out their duties in a wholly non-partisan manner. Traditional leaders – chiefs, headmen, and village heads – are not allowed to be politically partisan, and must report all crimes in their areas of jurisdiction, without exception, to the police.

Thirdly, the Office of the Attorney-General (and the Attorney-General) must be completely non-partisan. The Attorney-General should be appointed with the agreement of both the President and the Prime Minister.

Fourthly, the state media – television, radio, and the press – shall be regulated by an independent body for instances of bias and the propagation of hate speech. Reform of the state media will a lengthy process, and, thus, in the short term all that is feasible is that there is an effective stop to all political bias and hate speech.

Add to this President Zuma’s latest comment that SADC observers need to be deployed well in advance of the election – now actually if the statements by the President and the Minister of Justice are to be taken seriously.

All of this will be difficult to achieve, but not impossible, but the big question is what to do if there is no credible attempt at reform. There can be only one position, that responsible political parties should not dignify flawed elections by participation. Actually, this should be their position right now. Whatever the constitution says, either the old or the new, adherence to minimal legalism will not solve the Zimbabwe crisis or bring legitimacy to the state if elections are a farce, and elections are farcical if citizens cannot speak, assemble, associate, and vote in complete freedom.

South Africa and SADC seem to see this quite clearly, but do Zimbabwean political parties. So, no reforms, no elections must be the call by all!

written by

Tony Reeler

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[1] RAU (2012), On Restoring National Institutions and Elections. The Governance Programme. March 2012. HARARE: RESEARCH & ADVOCACY UNIT; Reeler, A. P (2013), Of Camels, Constitutions, and Elections. February 2013. HARARE: RESEARCH & ADVOCACY UNIT.

Homos in high places. The Disease is catching?

“The constitution is never cast in stone. These loopholes must be picked up and there should be political will . . . In South Africa, they have failed to deal with the issue of homosexuality because there are homos in high places. The same can be said of the United States and other countries. We need to be vigilant on these kinds of loopholes. This is a big step and let’s subject it to further discussion,” he said.[1]

For those of us used to homophobic statements, it might come as a surprise that this statement came from the Prime Minister and not from someone in ZANU PF. In three or four sentences, the Prime Minister not only indulges in a bit of hate speech – homos? – insults our South African neighbours and the United States, and then, to top it all, tells us that this much vaunted constitution has “loopholes” that will need correction in the future.

These kinds of reckless statements by senior politicians should never be allowed to pass unremarked or commented upon. So, let’s look at what the Honourable Prime Minister is saying, both explicitly and implicitly.

Take so-called “gay rights”. The Honourable Prime Minister seems to be oblivious of the contents of the Declaration of Rights in the constitution that he asked all to support. He might like to take time out his busy schedule to read RAU’s analysis of the Declaration of Rights[2], and he will be very surprised to see that he and his party (and the other parties) have committed themselves publicly to positions that will rather assist than impede “gay rights”. He can’t blame anyone else as the final draft was bashed out by the Principals in the end. He does come across as a teensy bit hypocritical, or perhaps he just does not read documents very carefully.

Building on this, the Honourable Prime Minister takes a swipe at South Africa, the USA, presumably all other Western countries that recognize “gay rights”, suggesting that the only reason that this has happened is because they have “homos” in high places. Really? This is getting to the far reaches of conspiracy theory: “gays” have such enormous power – like Jews or capitalists, or is it both of these – that they can force “unwilling” populations to accept the rights of LGBT people in their midst? Apart from the crudity of expression, which is unbecoming a national leader, the insult to other sovereign nations does not suggest a good grasp of the politics of diplomacy. We can be fairly sure that South Africa, a country that is very proud of its constitution and the manner in which it has created a functioning democracy, will find this a very crass and stupid remark.

But let’s get to the core of the real problem. The constitution has many loopholes? And the way forward is to close those by Parliamentary action, and presumably we can then have a new constitution that requires 19 or 20 amendments? You cannot be serious, Honourable Prime
Minister.

But of course you are. Senior members of both MDC parties have continuously told their civil society critics to just go with the current process because, once they are in power, they will amend it or get a new one. So, the draft (and soon to be the substantive) constitution is now a serious contribution to creating democracy, it is merely a device to get SADC off our backs so that we can get down to the more serious business of elections. And when MDC does not win an election – and this can happen – will ZANU PF amend the constitution? Not likely because this constitution strengthens rather than weakens Presidential powers[3]. But, of course, the Honorable Prime Minister does know this, and this is why he is able to say to his critics that it is not sensible to have an executive without strong powers, as he did recently[4]. So, Honourable Prime Minister, Zimbabweans don’t want a stronger presidency – as you might recall from your days with the NCA – and they want accountable leadership, both for what leadership does and what it says.

As for the disease? Perhaps it is not homophobia, but a more simple case of foot-in-mouth disease?

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[1] Churches express displeasure over draft constitution, Moses Matenga, Newsday, March 18, 2013.

[2] Matyszak, D A (2013), THE DECLARATION OF RIGHTS AND ZIMBABWE’S DRAFT CONSTITUTION. March 2013. HARARE: RESEARCH & ADVOCACY UNIT.

[3] Matyszak, D A (2013), Presidential Powers and the Draft Constitution, March 2013. HARARE: RESEARHC A& ADVOCACY UNIT.

[4] Tsvangirai defends retention of executive powers. Daily News. Thursday, 14 March 2013. http://www.dailynews.co.zw

What is Election Violence?

This seems a rather stupid question to ask, and especially in Zimbabwe where we talk about this endlessly. However, this is not a trivial question, and we remember 2008 and 2002 more clearly than we do 2005. Simply put, is the killing, beating, and raping of citizens worse from the point of elections than the threatening, terrifying, and starving of the them? It all depends on the purpose and the consequence.

 

If the consequence is to change the result of the vote and hence who governs, then surely both are equivalent as regards the final result: that those who use either strategy subvert the real purpose of elections? Which is what? Surely that the citizens can ensure, freely, that those that govern have the mandate to govern?

 

So, we need to be very clear, when we talk about elections, and we talk about election violence, that we are clear about what this is. So, when killing, beating, and raping do not happen, but threatening, terrifying, and starving does, we are certain that election violence still happened. We need no repeats of 2008 and 2002, or  even 2005!

 

So what do we mean when we talk about election violence? Consider this definition:

 

…Acts or threats of coercion, intimidation, or physical harm perpetrated to affect an

electoral process or that arises in the context of electoral competition. When

perpetrated to affect an electoral process, violence may be employed to influence the process of elections – such as efforts to delay, disrupt, or derail a poll – and to influence the outcomes: the determining of winners in competitive races for political office or to secure approval or disapproval of referendum questions.

 

As Timothy Sisk points out above this is considerably broader than the presence of physical violence: it is the range of activities aimed at subverting the will of ordinary citizens to freely exercise their choice[1].

 

Electoral violence is a sub-type of political violence in which actors employ coercion in an

instrumental way to advance their interests or achieve specific political ends. Similarly,

societies prone to experiencing election-related violence are normally vulnerable to

broader kinds of political violence; Kosovo, India, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Kenya, or

Colombia are examples of instances in which electoral violence is embedded in a

broader, often ongoing context of deep-rooted social conflict.

 

Electoral violence includes acts, such as assassination of opponents or spontaneous

fisticuffs between rival groups of supporters and threats, coercion, and intimidation of

opponents, voters, or election officials. Threat and intimidation is a form of coercion

that is just as powerful as acts of violence can be. Indeed, one purpose of acts of

terrorism such as tossing a grenade into a crowd of rival supporters is an act

diabolically designed to induce fear and to intimidate (e.g., to suppress mobilization or

voting by that group).

 

Violent acts can be targeted against people or things, such as the targeting of

communities or candidates or the deliberate destruction of campaign materials, vehicles,

offices, or ballot boxes.

 

Electoral violence is more than just physical violence: it is the purpose behind violence, and the oscillation between physical violence and psychological violence that enable us to understand this purpose in Zimbabwe. The results of the elections in 2005 can only be understood in the context of the violence of 2002 and 2008. That 2005 was less violent than the two previous elections is not really the point, and it would be useful here if the South African Government would stop contesting the release of the Khampepe/Moseneke report: we could then see the nexus between 2000/2002 and 2005.

 

And, just maybe, SADC would own up to the Principles that it promulgated so piously in 2005, and start to insist that the GPA required constitutional change and reform, then elections, rather than accepting the weak compromise offered by the GNU of constitutional change, then elections and reform. Then maybe the SADC Treaty would be a real, substantive document as opposed to a loose-leaf folder from which pages are removed whenever they are inconvenient! And they are especially inconvenient when elections (and sometimes courts and court decisions) leave the members in potential conflict with each other over who has the right to rule.

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[1] Sisk, T. D, Elections in Fragile States: Between Voice and Violence. Paper Prepared for The International Studies Association Annual Meeting. San Francisco, California. March 24-28, 2008.

Let’s keep our promise!

We have been speaking about an end to violence against women at every opportunity we have e.g. during the 16 Days of Gender Activism, The Women and Peace Conference  and on V Day with the One Billion Rising and we will speak up again on International Women’s Day on the 8th March but where is the action?

This year’s theme for Women’s Day  is “A promise is a promise: Time for action to end violence against women.” Let’s all do our part to end the violence against women and girls.

But how will we do this? How can we really change the world so that it is women friendly? Are we trying to make patriarchy more “female friendly”? Or are we trying to re-design patriarchy altogether? Is this time to start the conversation amongst women about what a “women designed” world might look like and would it look anything like the world as it is?

One place to start is in discussions about the political structures that govern all of us. What would democracy look like if designed by women? Zimbabwean women, supported by Idasa, have begun this project and their first thoughts have been published and will be presented in a book being launched on Friday this week. If you are interested, come to the launch at the Book Café at 11am on Friday, 8^th March.

Kenya, Zimbabwe and elections

…though Kenya is in a better position than Zimbabwe, neither country has achieved the necessary reforms, as set out by their respective power-sharing agreements, to hold free and fair elections in 2013. While Kenya continues along a slow but determined road towards democratisation, it needs to start focusing on reconciliation and national cohesion efforts, to create a support base for the institutional reforms that are being achieved. Zimbabwe on the other hand, needs to start taking its transition seriously. It should first establish a constitution that is owned and supported by the people, from which other legislative reform can emerge. Zimbabwe must also address social cleavages so that election violence is minimized and political disputes can be resolved peacefully but most importantly so that Zimbabweans can start rebuilding their country[1].

 

The conclusion from this report, based on a meeting between Kenyans and Zimbabweans in 2012, are hardly heart-warming. As the Kenyan elections draw to their conclusion, and Zimbabweans anticipate their forthcoming elections, where will either country be by the end of the year? Both welcomed back to the fold of responsible international citizens, or once again embroiled in the negotiating of new power sharing arrangements?

 

For both countries, a relatively simple formula was agreed in the power sharing arrangements: new constitutions, reforms and then elections. Kenyans achieved their new constitution with huge consensus and enormous public participation, and then were able to engage the processes of reform needed ahead of elections. Zimbabweans have been caught up in an acrimonious process throughout the period of constitutional consultation, producing a draft at the eleventh hour, and consequently no reforms of any substance have taken place. In fact, the differences between Kenya and Zimbabwe in the area of reform are marked. As the Idasa report points out:

 

In summary, Kenya has been more successful than Zimbabwe in creating strong independent institutions. Kenya, despite several cases of procedural irregularity, has a more balanced relationship between the parties to the coalition government, and this has led to an ability to develop and adopt legislation and follow through on institutional reform. The gains made in this field include the adoption of a new constitution as well as ECK, security sector and judicial reform. In Zimbabwe, by comparison, the lack of independence of institutions due to the power imbalance has all but blocked reform, most specifically, reform of the Security Sector, the Judiciary and the ZEC. Both countries have failed to address media bias, corruption or electoral violence institutionally, presumably because those responsible for addressing these issues fear implication in the planning or orchestration of such activities[2].

 

Constitutions are only as good as the institutions that can implement and protect them, and this will be the acid test in examining how successful the two experiments have been. Perhaps it will be the constitutional process that will be the bench mark for seeing how well reform and then elections take place, and certainly there are huge differences between Kenya and Zimbabwe in this respect. Kenya was able to produce a draft in very good time that was very strongly supported by its citizens in a very peaceful referendum. Zimbabwe, by contrast, has had a miserable time of it, still has serious dissenters, and probably will get qualified acceptance in a low poll. And whether Justice Chiweshe is correct or not in his interpretation of the law, it is nonetheless unacceptable that citizens have such little time to examine the constitution.

 

As RAU and many others have continually pointed out, behind this sorry state of affairs in Zimbabwe is the blunt refusal of one party to contemplate the kinds of reforms necessary to the holding of decent elections. The other party demands reforms but passes on every significant issue that would demonstrate its commitment to reform. And so the needed transformation of “captured” state institutions has not taken place. The reforms in Kenya are not wonderful, but there has been reform in many areas, civil society has been visible and engaged in this, and consequently the electorate has gone into this election in great numbers. Assuming that it does not go as wrong as it did in 2008, and the losers accept their loss, Kenya may have made a very serious step towards consolidating its democracy: not because of elections per se, but because the reforms of state institutions created the conditions for good elections.

 

This is not the case for Zimbabwe, and, looking into the crystal ball, we might predict highly qualified support for the constitution, elections that lead to dispute and non-acceptance of the results, and more wrangling over what form a new GNU should take. And this is simply because the formula in Kenya – constitution AND reform, then elections – has not been the formula in Zimbabwe, where were have been forced in a less desirable formula – constitution, then elections and THEN reform.

 

The need for reform in Zimbabwe will be demonstrated once again with the release by Idasa on Friday of a detailed analysis of the state of Zimbabwe’s “democracy”, this time in a book authored by women researchers. This will undoubtedly show how much needed to be done under the GPA, and how little has in fact been done.

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[1] See Eaglestone, A (2012), Ready or Not? Elections in Kenya and Zimbabwe in 2013. February 2013

Monitoring and Measuring Democracy Team, Idasa.

[2] See again Eaglestone, A (2012), Ready or Not? Elections in Kenya and Zimbabwe in 2013. p10.

5 Reasons why this woman is voting “Yes” in the Constitutional Referendum

Today we are using a piece by Teresa Mugadza which she wants disseminated widely. Leading up to the referendum on 16 March we will continue to put both our researcher’s views on the new Constitution and any others we feel may be interesting.

I want to start with a disclaimer. First, I do not represent anyone but myself and therefore my views are myopic to the extent that I represent my selfish interests. Second, I am a functionary of the inclusive government as a Commissioner, so I am sure there are some that will perceive me to be compromised just by that station. I, however, believe that this does not and should not preclude me from voicing my position as a Zimbabwean woman. Further, I am persuaded that after having read the Draft Constitution I owe it to fellow women, to state why I have chosen to vote “YES”.

Now having dispensed with the disclaimer, I must also hasten to add, that my decision to vote “YES” is not in any way to suggest that I do not have any issues related to the formulation of the Draft Constitution or the processes related to the forthcoming Referendum. I do… starting with the fact that I honestly do not believe that the process leading to the Draft Constitution itself was as participatory as it could have been. I am of the firm view that women were not heard to the extent they should have been. There is ample evidence of this from the COPAC reports. In terms of the forthcoming Constitutional Referendum itself, I am of the view that the time given for dissemination and analysis of the Draft Constitution to Zimbabweans is too short. I am not persuaded that exactly 30 days is adequate time for the kind of reading of the Draft Constitution that citizens need in order to make informed decisions on the day of the Referendum itself.  Finally I am not persuaded that the Draft Constitution will be circulated as widely as it should be before the Referendum. This could very well mean that people may end up voting for a Draft Constitution they have neither seen nor read and sadly in some instances, for a document whose contents they do not understand.

Now having dispensed with the preliminary issues, I want to go into why I am voting “Yes”.

1. I am a firm believer in participation. One of my good friends likes to say “decisions are made by those that participate”, and I totally subscribe to that idea. I have voted in every election and referendum since I became eligible to vote, and this Referendum is going to be no exception. I will vote because I want to participate in what I believe is a very important and historic process in Zimbabwe’s democracy. Especially given that this process that will lead to the winding up of the inclusive government; something that everyone knows is long overdue!
2. I do not want my rights to continue being determined by the Lancaster House Constitution. Voting “NO” would mean continuing under the current constitution. Never mind that my interests [even minimally] were never represented at its crafting; the current constitution limits my rights as woman, provides for my discrimination in certain instances and does not guarantee my right to participate in public life. Remember the notorious Section 23(3)? Given what I know is possible from the Draft Constitution; I have no reason to support the continuance of a constitution that discriminates against me!
3. I am convinced that the Draft Constitution presents an opportunity for greater accountability in the exercise of power, something that is absent in the current Constitution.  Thus I will vote “YES” to ensure that the opportunity to encourage accountability is not lost.
4. As stated earlier, I have had the privilege of reading the Draft Constitution. While indeed there are areas that could and should be improved in the future, I think the Draft Constitution has some very good provisions for women viz;

• The Draft Constitution provides for the supremacy of the constitution over all other laws and policies, which means guarantee of women’s rights at the highest level.
• The Draft Constitution is very clear that any law, policy, custom or tradition in violation of the guaranteed rights of women is unconstitutional.
• The objectives of the Draft Constitution state that the provisions of the constitution will among other things promote the full participation of women in all spheres of life, recognizing women’s right to work and the fact that the work women do in raising a family is work. Importantly, the objectives also stress the importance of prevention of domestic violence and promotion of the girl child’s right to education.
• The right to citizenship now applies on similar and equal criteria to women and men.
• The bill of rights under the Draft Constitution is protected by law, comprehensive and even provides for expansion of those rights to include rights protected under international law.
• The Draft Constitution provides for enhanced access to information and increases the grounds upon which one can claim access to information held by the State.
• The Draft Constitution provides for equality in the guardianship and custody of children.
• The Draft Constitution guarantees the right to equal pay and maternity leave.
• The Draft Constitution provides for guaranteed “affirmative action” seats for women in Parliament, in addition to the ones those women wishing to contest will also have.
• The Draft Constitution provides that the executive power is exercised through Cabinet subject to the Constitution, again reaffirming the supremacy of the Constitution over any law or policy.

1. Finally, I am a woman so I don’t forget easily. There are two things I learnt in a similar process many years ago… also known as the 2000 Referendum.  First, I voted “NO” then, and the situation in my personal space and our nation worsened. I believe this is an opportunity to redeem myself. Second, as a woman, I think it is criminal for any nation to spend the amount and extent of resources [financial, human and time] as has been the case in the Constitutional Reform processes in Zimbabwe, twice in 12 years!, and still have nothing to show for it.

So for the above reasons, plus the many other positive and progressive provisions in the Draft Constitution that I have not addressed here, I am voting “YES”! I also hope my reasons for voting “YES” can inspire conversations on this Draft Constitution and encourage more women to participate in the Referendum.

Teresa Mugadza is the Deputy Chairperson of the Zimbabwe Anti-corruption Commission. She is writing in her in personal capacity and the views expressed in this article are her own.

 

Proportional Representation: Exploring the Unknown Unknown

“There are known knowns. These are things we know that we know. There are known unknowns. That is to say, there are things that we know we don’t know. But there are also unknown unknowns. There are things we don’t know we don’t know.” This well known quote from Donald Rumsfeld comes to mind when considering the provisions relating to proportional representation which appear in the proposed constitution for the country. It is apparent, at least as far as the main political parties are concerned, that issues relating to proportional representation presently fall with the group of unknown unknowns.

The proposed constitution beguilingly provides that 60 of the 80 members of the Senate (six from each of the ten provinces, elected in such a manner as to ensure a near gender parity), 60 of the 270 members of the National Assembly (again, six from each province, all of whom must be women) and 10 persons on each Provincial Council, will be elected on the basis of proportional representation.

Thus the proposed constitution stipulates that an Act of Parliament must provide for the conduct of elections, and in particular, for a system of proportional representation for the election of persons to the seats in the Senate, the seats reserved for women in the National Assembly[1] and the procedure for filling vacancies in those seats.[2]

The election of Senators and Provincial Councillors is through a party-list system of proportional representation. This is based on the votes cast for candidates representing political parties in each of the provinces in the general election for Members of the National Assembly and in which male and female candidates are listed alternately, every list being headed by a female candidate. The formula used for those elected through proportional representation to the 60 seats reserved for women in National Assembly is the same, bar one important difference. While there is obviously no need for a requirement that male and female candidates are listed alternately on the party lists, the relevant provision egregiously omits any mention of party lists entirely.

Nonetheless, the broad idea is this: suppose, merely by way of illustration, that of the total votes cast for the National Assembly seats in the constituencies lying in Masvingo Province, MDC-T garners three-sixths, ZANU PF two sixths and MDC one-sixth. Then the top three persons on the MDC-T list of candidates for the Senate will gain seats, and the top two on the ZANU PF list for the Senate and the top candidate on the MDC list for the Senate will also gain seats. A similar process would be adopted for the Provincial Councils and the National Assembly women – though in the latter instance, how the candidates are to be determined is left open in the absence of any mention of party lists.

At first glance this seems straight forward and for this reason no further links seem to have been added to the chain of thought of the persons who negotiated the proposed constitution. However, unknown to the political parties, the devil lies in the unknown details of proportional representation which can lead to fiendish complexities.[3]

The aleatory fates will never be so kind that when the ratio of constituency votes in each province per party is determined, the result will be integers – such as 3:2:1. The calculation will, to be certain, produce ratios of the following ilk – 2.7 seats to MDC-T; 2.3 seats to ZANU PF; 0.67 seats to MDC and 0.33 seats to ZAPU.

What is to be done with the fractions? One could round MDC-T’s ratio up to the nearest integer and give it three seats and round ZANU PF’s down and give them two. What of the minor party votes? One could put their votes together and let them have a combined seat, or one could say they didn’t get enough votes separately for a seat, so the calculation must be done afresh ignoring their votes and dividing the seats amongst those who did get enough votes for a seat.

This is to provide but a few examples. There are a score of proportional representation systems which attempt to deal with this issue and which proffer different solutions to the problem. But crucially, the choice of system will affect the number of seats allocated to each party. One system might yield a 3:3 split of seats between MDC-T and ZANU PF, another a 4:2 split, and yet another a 3:2 split, all based on the same number of votes cast for each party. If this scenario is replicated for each of the ten provinces, the difference could be an extra ten seats in the National Assembly for one party if a system favourable to that party is deployed. If the balance of power in Parliament pertaining currently is replicated in the next election, these ten seats could determine whether a party holds a majority of seats in Parliament or not.

This majority would have the power to prevent or allow legislation to be sent to the President for his or her necessary assent and its passage into law. It would also hold the majority on the vital Parliamentary Committee on Standing Rules and Orders which determines the composition of the various Constitutional Commissions.

The proposed constitution blithely provides that an Act of Parliament shall provide “a system of proportional representation”. Which system is selected may be of vital importance. Some systems favour small parties; some favour large parties with a slight numerical advantage; and some favour large parties with a slight numerical disadvantage. Once the parties have crunched the numbers from the last elections and made their prognoses for the next, there may be some hard bargaining and negotiating to be done over the choice of proportional representation system.

Parliament will stand automatically dissolved on June 29^th, 2013 by which time this issue will need to be resolved so that the legislation is in place in time for the election, which as legalities now have it, ought to be on roughly the same date.[4] Given the pace at which past negotiations have taken place between the main political parties, RAU respectfully suggests that each party’s respective mathematicians and statisticians get number crunching now and the talks on this issue commence immediately thereafter.

 

Derek Matyszak

RAU 26.02.13

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[1] For unknown reasons the members of the Provincial Council elected by proportional representation are omitted from this provision (section 157).

[2] The vacancies must be filled by persons belonging to the same political parties and who are of the same gender as those who previously held the seats.

[3] And sophisticated and subtle voter decision making. This is exacerbated by the fact that the way proportional representation has been structured under the proposed constitution means that a single vote for a National Assembly candidate will also determine the elector’s choice of reserved seats for women in the National Assembly, Senatorial candidates and Provincial Councillors. What if the voter adores the first candidate on the party Senate list and abhors the candidate standing for the National Assembly? And what if a candidate beloved of the party but less so of the electorate is put up as a party candidate for the National Assembly and placed top of the Senate list?

[4] A court order, which already reflects two applications for a postponement, requires the President to gazette the dates for three of several outstanding by-elections before the 31^st March, 2013.  Although, the order only pertains to by-elections in three constituencies, the postponement of the by-elections has been granted on the basis of the President’s assertions that he intends to set the dates for a general election before the 31^st March, 2013. His proclamation in this regard must set the date for the sitting of the nomination courts no later than 21 days from the date of the proclamation and the elections must take place no later than 63 days after the sitting of the nomination courts. This makes the latest date for the elections (if a further postponement is not sought or the President is not to be held in contempt of Court) the 23rd June, 2013.

Elections yet again

There is an inevitable sense of trepidation when elections start to loom in Zimbabwe, especially since 2000. All too often it feels that we merely repeat the same cycle without any evidence of learning from the mistakes of the past. It is for this reason that it is very important to carefully examine the past, and, to this end, RAU would like to emphasize some of its own findings from past elections, particularly 2008.

2008 is important because there were two elections in very quick succession. The first, in March 2008, was very peaceful and well-administered up to the point of the count, when things went very wrong. The second was hardly peaceful and probably the most violent election ever in Zimbabwe, though many have forgotten just how violent the 2002 Presidential election was.

Below are links to a selection or reports that RAU feels are useful guides to thinking about 2013. Other reports can be found on the RAU website which is: www.researchandadvocacyunit.org

An edited selection of the more important reports was produced by Derek Matyszak for the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, and this can be found by following the link immediately below:

Matyszak, D.A (2010), Law, Politics, and Zimbabwe’s ‘Unity’ Government, KONRAD ADENAUER STIFTUNG in association with the Research and Advocacy Unit [RAU].

[http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_21234-1522-1-30.pdf?101124145357]

In addition to this compendium are a number of other useful reports, some talking about the violence, others dealing with the electoral irregularities, and others dealing with the setting up the GPA:

Kwinjeh. G (2008), Staring a gift horse in the mouth. Death Spiral in Zimbabwe: Mediation, Violence and the GNU. 18 June 2008.

[http://www.researchandadvocacyunit.org/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_download&gid=134&Itemid=90]

Pigou, P (2008), Defining Violation: Political Violence or Crimes Against Humanity. June 2008. SITO: IDASA.

[http://www.idasa.org/our_products/resources/output/how_to_lose_an_election_and/?pid=states_in_transition]

Matyszak, D. (2008), How to lose an election and stay in power. June 2008. RESEARCH & ADVOCACY UNIT.

[http://www.idasa.org/our_products/resources/output/how_to_lose_an_election_and/?pid=states_in_transition]

Matyszak. D. (2008), Opinion on the legality of the presidential election which took place in Zimbabwe on June 27th 2009, and the legitimacy of any incumbent assuming office on the basis of the result of such an election. SITO: IDASA.

[http://www.researchandadvocacyunit.org/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_download&gid=134&Itemid=90]

RAU (2009), Hear no Evil, See no evil, Speak no evil: A critique of the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission report on the 2008 General Elections. Report produced by Derek Matyszak (Senior Researcher). July 2009. HARARE: RESEARCH & ADVOCACY UNIT.

[http://www.researchandadvocacyunit.org/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_download&gid=134&Itemid=90]

RAU (2009), 2013 Vision – Seeing Double and the Dead. A preliminary Audit of Zimbabwe’s Voters’ Roll. Derek Matyszak. September 2009. HARARE: RESEARCH & ADVOCACY UNIT.

[http://www.researchandadvocacyunit.org/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_download&gid=134&Itemid=90]

 

Displacements: Old Wine in New Bottles

Over the decades, forced displacement has been frequently used in Zimbabwe as a political weapon. During the Liberation War, hundreds of thousands of rural Zimbabweans were forced from their homes and into “keeps”, so-called “protected villages”, in order to prevent their support for the freedom fighters. It is a tactic that has been repeatedly used subsequently since 2000, with Operation Murambatsvina the most notorious of the many examples.

However, it is not so evident to many that there has massive displacement, probably exceeding that of Operation Murambatsvina [OM], under the land reform process begun in 2000. This displacement has not been as overtly dramatic as OM, but has permanently displaced many more than under OM.

It is certainly the case that the displacement of the white commercial farmers has received huge media coverage whilst that of the black commercial farmworkers has not received anything like the same attention.

RAU has been examining the effects of displacement over the past 5 years, and issued a number of reports on this, as well as a documentary that has received critical appreciation. The report and the film on the effects of displacement on the commercial farm workers can be found by following the links below:

GAPWUZ (2009), If something wrong…The invisible suffering of commercial farm workers and their families due to “land reform”. Report prepared by the Research & Advocacy Unit and the Justice for Agriculture Trust. November 2009. HARARE: GENERAL AGRICULTURAL AND PLANTATION WORKERS UNION OF ZIMBABWE.

 

[http://www.researchandadvocacyunit.org/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_download&gid=142&Itemid=90]

 

RAU (2009), “House of Justice”. 26 minute documentary on the SADC Tribunal and current farm invasions in contempt of the ruling. HARARE: RESEARCH & ADVOCACY UNIT.

[http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AqOjiq19rHk].

 

JAG/GAPWUZ (2007), DESTRUCTION OF ZIMBABWE’S BACKBONE INDUSTRY IN PURSUIT OF POLITICAL POWER. A qualitative report on events in Zimbabwe’s commercial farming sector since the year 2000. Report prepared by the Justice for Agriculture Trust [JAG] & the General Agricultural and Plantation Workers Union of Zimbabwe [GAPWUZ]. April 2008. HARARE: JUSTICE FOR AGRICULTURE TRUST.

 

[http://www.researchandadvocacyunit.org/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_download&gid=142&Itemid=90]